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Theory that can face fact ... is what we need.
Karl Llewellynt
The scene is Beijing. You are an international political adviser to the
government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The news domi-
nating the cable traffic is that Argentina has invaded the Falkland Is-
lands.' Even though the invasion is on the other side of the planet, in a
region in which the PRC is not directly involved, you will follow the
events there with great interest for the next several weeks.
Some of your colleagues will be concerned about the military dimen-
sions of the conflict, for example, problems encountered in launching am-
* © Copyright 1985 by W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard. These articles will
appear in a forthcoming book.
t Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
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1. Spanish speakers refer to the islands as Las Malvinas. Because use of the English or
Spanish designation generally marks the user as pro-British or pro-Argentine, United Nations
documents, in an effort to escape the politics of names, designate the islands as Falklands/
Malvinas. I have used the English name alone, because it seems awkward to use both; no
political implication should be deduced.
For historical background of the conffict, see GOEBEL, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FALK-
LAND ISLANDS: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC HIsTORY (rev. ed. 1982); for a review
of recent literature and an analysis of the 1982 war in legal perspective, see Reisman, Struggle
for the Falklands, 93 YALE L.J. 287 (1983).
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phibious attacks on well-defended island positions, establishing supply
lines over long distances, and using weapons in hostile natural environ-
ments. But you will be absorbed in quite a different aspect of the matter:
the reactions of the international community to the unilateral assertion
by a continental nation of a right to seize an offshore island.
The reason is obvious. The People's Republic has claims (the validity
of which is now acknowledged by most other states in the world) to the
island of Taiwan,2 some 100 miles off the Chinese mainland. But even
those who concede your claims have admonished you not to use force to
regain Taiwan. While the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of
force in general terms, you recognize that force is often used in interstate
relations and is sometimes not seriously condemned.3 The distant war
over the Falkland Islands is of great interest to you because it is almost a
laboratory test of just how serious are the objections to the use of force in
a situation of this sort. A high degree of actual tolerance for Argentina's
unilateral action - words and other verbal cbndemnations notwith-
standing - may be a signal that the international community is willing
to accept such unilateral military assertions of right. Substantial con-
demnation of Argentina and effective support for the United Kingdom
may indicate exactly the opposite.
Political Inferences and International Law
In your analysis of a complex event like the Falklands War, you are in
fact making inferences about the normative expectations of those who are
politically effective in the world community. These expectations consti-
tute significant variables in international political behavior, because
shared notions of what is right influence perception, reaction, and capac-
ity for mobilization. These inferences about what other actors think is
acceptable behavior are not derived from international judgments or
from constitutional documents, statutes, or treaties. They are almost en-
tirely derived from the responses of key actors to a critical event. The
2. For the American position, see the so-called Shanghai Communique, Feb. 27, 1972 in
United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's : The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report by
President Richard Nixon to the Congress 28-41 (1972). The United States position was reiter-
ated in the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United
States and the People's Republic of China, 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 25-26 (1979). See also, State-
ment of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 18 I.L.M. 274 (1979). But the issue
of title is not without controversy: see Chen & Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for
International Title, 81 YALE L. J. 599 (1972).
3. See generally BLECHMAN & KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S. ARMED FORCES
AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT (1978). For legal appraisal, see Reisman, Coercion and Self-
Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984). See also Reis-
man, Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, 1984 PROc. AM.
SoC'Y OF INT'L L. (forthcoming).
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expectations and demands of those actors themselves may have been
shaped, in part, by many of the formal sources of law just mentioned. But
whether those formal sources of law have genuine significance or are
merely a facade concealing raw and ephemeral political calculations can
only be assessed when you have seen how they fared in a particular
incident.4
Political advisors are constantly studying incidents such as the Falk-
land Islands War and making inferences from them about politically rele-
vant expectations. These inferences are constantly updated by new
information gleaned from similar events. In predicting or projecting fu-
ture behavior, of course, account is taken of a variety of other unique
political factors that characterize any event. It is no disservice to law to
acknowledge that prescriptions about what one ought to do are, alas,
only one factor in deciding what one will do. Naturally, the weight ac-
corded prescriptive norms will vary with the factual context, the identity
of the actors, and the effectiveness of the legal system enforcing the
norms.
The normative expectations that political analysts infer from events
are the substance of much of contemporary international law. The fact
that the people who are inferring norms from incidents do not refer to
the product of their inquiry as "international law" in no way affects the
validity of their enterprise, any more than Molire's M. Jourdain's oblivi-
ousness to the fact that he was speaking prose meant that he was not.
Whatever it is called, law it is. Yet, at least on first consideration, it is
startlingly inconsistent with our accepted notions of law to suggest that
one ought to orient oneself in the international legal system by reference
to these incidents rather than primarily by reference to statutes, treaties,
venerable custom and judicial and arbitral opinions. Indeed, as we shall
see, the jurisprudential implications of this reorganization of focus are
profound, in ways going beyond even Jellinek's disquieting observation
about the "normative force of the factual." 5
International Lawyers and Incidents
International lawyers frequently lament the fact that they are rarely
consulted by foreign policy decisionmakers. This cannot be attributed to
4. The problem is not identifying "sources" of law, but being certain that something in a
particular source is law. "[Miore traditional approaches, such as the enumeration of sources in
the International Court's statute article 38 are not wrong, but are incomplete. Something may
fall within one of the formal sources, but simply not be or have ceased to be law." Reisman,
International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 1981 PROC. AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. 101,
119 (1981).
5. G. JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 308 (1900).
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a general, visceral dislike of lawyers, for government officials, when oper-
ating in a domestic setting, frequently consult their lawyers. They cor-
rectly assume that lawyers are reliable specialists in understanding the
expectations of those who are politically and legally effective. Why is it
that the same decisionmakers do not resort to their international lawyers
with comparable frequency?
There are numerous reasons why international lawyers are increas-
ingly irrelevant in many areas of international politics, not all of them
attributable to the lawyers themselves. We cannot ignore the advanced
decay of the formal legal system that was painstakingly reconstructed
after World War II. One is as unlikely to seek and pay for the advice of
the votaries of a demonstrably ineffective legal system as one is to seek
and pay for the blessings of the high priests of a sect manifestly out of
favor with the pertinent divinity. But the problems we call "legal" con-
tinue to present themselves for resolution, whatever the state of the sys-
tem; someone must perform legal functions even in a decaying system.
The reasons for the diminished relevance of international lawyers are
attributable less to the system than to the international lawyers them-
selves and the jurisprudential framework within which they operate. For
key areas of public international law, international lawyers make them-
selves irrelevant by failing to identify what international law in this con-
text is and by failing to report it to those to whom they are responsible.
International lawyers pay relatively little attention to the incidents from
which political advisers infer their normative universe. Rather, they per-
sist in constructing their normative universe from texts. They thus con-
fine their attention to sources of international law that were either merely
ceremonial at their inception, or that, although animated by more nor-
mative intentions when they were created, have ceased to be congruent
with expectations of authority and control held by effective elites.
To be sure, some international lawyers try to examine practice but, as
we will see, that exercise is quite a different enterprise from the intuitive
legal research of the political adviser. Rather than seeing incidents as
norm-indicators or norm-generators, as does the political adviser, the in-
ternational lawyer generally reacts to them in judgmental fashion, assum-
ing that the norm in question is a priori and enduring and examining the
incidents in terms. of whether they indicate that a particular norm has
been violated.
The question the political analyst will ask, in contrast, is not simply
whether the acts at issue have violated some preexisting norm but rather,
whether expectations entertained by effective elites about what is permis-
sible may be inferred from their behavior. The question is eminently
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practical, for even those who do not regularly use the word "law" in their
discourse, and even those who snicker when others use it, must make
estimates about the subjectivities of allies and adversaries alike. These
subjectivities necessarily include what those actors think is right. In a
world in which allies and adversaries do not submit to intensive inter-
views and rarely volunteer or are permitted to tell the whole truth (if any
part of it), deeds - actions and reactions - become one of the few avail-
able windows to what others are thinking, either consciously or
unconsciously.
By default, the political adviser becomes a do-it-yourself lawyer.
Finding the Law in Domestic Systems
All lawyers, whether domestic or international, face the same core
problem in seeking to ascertain the law: to identify the operational
norms used by those who are politically and legally relevant in projected
situations, so that accurate predictions of how they are likely to charac-
terize and react to different behavioral options can be made, and the most
promising plans of action can be fashioned and recommended to the
client.
In the United States, identifying the law is simple and relatively rou-
tinized. For one thing, the lawyer knows who the decisionmakers are.
Statutes are reliable guides to legal expectations, but it is court decisions
that present the real test: experience has taught American lawyers that
for almost all of their purposes, lawmaking is what the courts in fact do.
That insight has allowed American legal science to adopt, as its basic
unit of knowledge, what we might call its "epistemic" unit, the appellate
decision. A tremendous and technologically impressive industry has de-
veloped to report, catalogue, and analyze these epistemic units, all of
which are made available to practitioners and scholars in retrieval sys-
tems of increasing speed and sophistication. The systems of inference
called "legal reasoning" or "legal logic" are applied to these epistemic
units and become an important part of the repertory of the lawyer in
predicting future decisions by courts and in trying to influence them.
Why have judicial decisions in the United States been a fairly accurate
indicator of the operational norms entertained by politically relevant
strata? Some American lawyers, without comparative or historical per-
spective, have assumed that the answer to that question can be found in
the inherent character of courts. This is a misleading oversimplification,
for it looks at a result without reference to the causal factors that pro-
duced it. In particular, it evades the important prior question of why
courts are effective in this environment. Not surprisingly, those who ac-
Yale Journal of International Law
cept this apparent insight and have sought to apply it in the international
sphere have concluded that the unruliness and violence of international
politics is attributable to the absence of courts. For instance, the Peace
Movement in the United States of the late 19th century was, in large part,
a movement to establish an international judicial system. Indeed, it was a
major factor in the creation of the international courts of the 20th cen-
tury.6 The locus classicus of this view was Andrew Carnegie's bequest
establishing the Peace Palace in the Hague as a home for the Permanent
Court of Arbitration. So confident was Carnegie that the Court would
succeed that he instructed the trustees to use the remainder of the money
in ways they thought most likely to serve the interests of mankind.
Since 1899, international courts in one form or another have existed,
but the unruliness and violence of the arena have persisted. Plainly, it is
not the presence or absence of courts that determines whether minimum
order will obtain. Other factors are critical.
Courts have been significant political institutions in the United States
not because of something inherent in courts or in the law they process
but because of the continuing congruence in U.S. politics of expectations
of authority and expectations of control. Expectations of authority are
subjective images of how power ought to be exercised; expectations of
control are subjective images of how power will in fact be exercised. The
more congruent those two sets of expectations, the more effective the
legal system in question. This is not the only possible constellation of
power and authority. In Venezuela, during the 19th century, to cite only
one contrasting example, a type of caudillo system obtained: all of the
formal institutions of power - legislature, court, and sometimes even the
executive branch - were essentially powerless, and were largely ignored
by those holding effective power.7
In the United States, the relatively stable political system and the pre-
eminent role assigned to courts within it had a striking effect on the soci-
ology of legal knowledge. Coordinately, it was an important factor in
stimulating the creation and then in shaping the unique direction of
American law schools and the specialized methods developed there for
teaching the "science of law." Oliver Wendell Holmes captured the basic
spirit of this new legal science when he stated that law was nothing more
than the prediction of what courts will do: "The prophecies of what the
6. For background see DAVIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCE (1962).
7. See, ag., R. PEREZ PERDOMO, EL FORMALISMO JURIDICO Y sus FUNCIONES SOCIALES
EN EL SIGLO XIX VENEZOLANO (1978); see also Reisman, Book Review, 29 AM. J. COMP. L.
727 (1981) (reviewing R. PEREZ PERDOMO, EL FORMALISMO JURIDICO Y sus FUNCIONES
SOCIALES EN EL SIGLO XIX VENEZOLANO (1978)).
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courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
the law."" Obviously, American lawyers were doing and continue to do
much more than merely predict what courts will do. But the power of
Holmes' insight derived from the regularly validated fact that what
courts in the United States were saying was a remarkably reliable indica-
tor of the probable future actions and reactions of effective elites. Given
this degree of predictive power, it is hardly surprising that lawyers
should have begun to study appellate decisions.
It has been said that a key part of the American genius is the capacity
to mass produce and distribute a good idea. Consistent with Holmes's
apothegm, Christopher Columbus Langdell established, at the Harvard
Law School, a teaching method which assumed that the fundamental epi-
stemic unit of legal science was the appellate opinion. "It seemed to me,"
Langdell wrote in the introduction to his casebook on contracts,". . . to
be possible to take such a branch of the law as Contracts, for example,
and, without exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify,
and arrange all the cases which had contributed in any important degree
to the growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential doc-
trines."9 Thus, one could organize these opinions into a coherent body of
law, treating each as a self-contained and self-explanatory unit, consis-
tent in its properties with others. The examination of these epistemic
units could provide the basis for a thorough and systematic legal
education.
Law schools stimulated the development of a new genre of legal litera-
ture, the "casebook," to be used in the institutions of legal education.
Casebooks encompassed the legal universe, for Langdell had decreed
"[fJirst, that law is a science; secondly [sic], that all of the available
materials of that science are contained in printed books."'1 This preoccu-
pation with cases engendered increasingly sophisticated procedures for
gathering, processing, analyzing and retrieving appellate opinions on a
national scale. All of these developments combined to enculturate, even
more intensely, those trained in American law, to think in terms of cases,
with all that that implied.
Transposing Domestic Methods to the International System
Since the end of the 19th century, great efforts have been mounted to
create in the international arena a set of institutions comparable to those
8. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173 (1921).
9. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vii (1871).
10. Address by Langdell (1886), cited in Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law
School, 5 PERSPECTIVES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 405, 436 (1971).
Yale Journal of International Law
to be found in Western Europe and North America. Since 1945, the result
of this handiwork has been a complex superstructure and administrative
apparatus which bears striking resemblance, at least superficially, to na-
tional governments in Western Europe and North America. In the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations, some purport to find something
comparable to a legislature. The Secretariat of the United Nations is
compared to a domestic Executive Branch, and the specialized agencies
of the United Nations are likened to the regulatory agencies of modern
industrial government. Most reassuring, the International Court sits in
splendor in the Hague, as the "principal judicial organ" of the United
Nations.1
Plainly, it is absurd to assume that the mere existence of this network
of international institutions means that it is as effective as a domestic
government and that its edicts may be relied upon; Holmes could plausi-
bly direct his readers to do no more than study the behavior of courts so
as to predict the development of law because the context within which
his courts operated gave them effective power to prescribe legal rules. 12
Professors who gave the same instructions to their students of interna-
tional law would be leading their charges into a fantasy world. The sad
fact is that the apparent governmental network that has been established
internationally has little power. What power it has in particular cases is
assigned to it by effective elites who have sometimes found it useful to use
the United Nations or a related agency in a particular instance.
Students of international law, like their domestic counterparts, fre-
quently tend to define decisions in terms of the institutions rendering
them. In the domestic law systems of Western Europe and North
America, courts, for historical reasons, have been deemed to be the au-
thoritative appliers of the law. Hence legal decisions are defined essen-
tially as the handicraft of those courts. Insofar as there is a congruence
between actual political power in the community and the authority of
courts, that focus can provide a cogent indicator of decisions. In fact,
such a congruence is rarely perfect, and the identification of judgments as
decisions in a larger sense frequently leads to the distortions characteris-
tic of much academic law. 13
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
12. Holmes, supra note 8 at 167.
13. Constitutional law in American law schools is identified as the work of the Supreme
Court in supervising the discharge of what is decided are the "constitutional functions" per-
formed by all other authorized agencies in the national community. But the Constitution is not
a document; it is an institution, as Llewellyn put it. As such, it involves a process in which
many other formal and informal, authoritative and functional actors participate. These, alas,
are never studied under the rubric of constitutional law. In this respect, there is no comprehen-
sive course on constitutional law in any meaningful sense in American law schools.
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Indeed, even in effectively organized legal systems, which are charac-
terized by a general convergence of authority and control, key parts of
"book law" may fail to approximate the actual normative expectations of
elites. This may occur for two major reasons, inherent in the very charac-
ter of law: discrepancies between myth system and operational code and
the differential rates of decay of text and context.
In an earlier study, I noted that, in all legal systems, much of what is
expressed in legal formulae and is attended by signals of authority is not
intended to govern, regulate, or provide effective guidelines for official or
private behavior. This part of the "legal system" conveys aspirations and
images, not of the way things are, but of the way group members like to
believe they are. This is particularly striking in the area of public law:
The picture produced by control institutions does not correspond, point for
point, with the actual flow of behavior of those institutions in the perform-
ance of their public function: indeed, there may be very great discrepancies
between it and the actual way of doing things. The persistent discrepancies
do not necessarily mean that there is no 'law,' that in those sectors "any-
thing goes," for some of those discrepancies may conform to a different
code. They may indicate an additional set of expectations and demands that
are effectively, though often informally, sanctioned and that guide actors
when they deal with 'the real world.' Hence we encounter two 'relevant'
normative systems: one that is supposed to apply, which continues to enjoy
lip service among elites, and one that is actually applied. Neither should be
confused with actual behavior, which may be discrepant from both.
A disengaged observer might call the norm system of the official picture the
myth system of the group. Parts of it provide the appropriate code of con-
duct for most group members; for some, most of it is their normative guide.
But there are enough discrepancies between this myth system and the way
things are actually done by key official or effective actors to force the ob-
server to apply another name for the unofficial but nonetheless effective
guidelines for behavior in those discrepant sectors: the operational code.
Bear in mind that the terms myth system and operational code are func-
tional creations of the observer for desciibing the actual flow of official be-
havior or the official picture.14
People who seek legal advice plainly require it with regard to both the
myth system and the operational code: myth system because it is applied
in part by some control institutions, operational code because it is ap-
plied by others. Myth system is readily retrievable through conventional
research in the formal repositories of law. Operational code, in contrast,
must be sought in elite behavior.
Even if there is little divergence between myth system and operational
14. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES AND REFORMS 15-16 (1979).
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code, the differing rate of decay of text and context may limit the useful-
ness of formal sources of law. The proverbial decrees of the Medes and
the Persians still exist; the context in which they were created and in
which they had legal relevance is gone. Whether a particular exercise of
lawmaking seeks to stabilize or change a situation, if it is concerned not
with ornamenting myth but with doing what it says it is doing, there
must be a minimum congruence between the socio-political context pre-
vailing at the time and the socio-political presumptions of the legislation.
Once legislation is expressed in relatively enduring textual form, how-
ever, its rate of decay is minimal, while the rate of decay of the envi-
roning socio-political situation will always be greater and may, indeed, be
extremely rapid.
Where fidelity to text acquires in itself a symbolic political value, texts
whose literal congruence with the socio-political situation is less than
when they were created may misguide those who would rely on them. At
the very least, those who would rely on them may need a validation tech-
nique for determining their degree of accuracy. Courts may serve this
purpose, but if they themselves and the ambit of their jurisdiction are
creatures of legislation, a functional and non-institutional test is required.
The Costs of Transposition
In the international arena, the law is applied, for the most part,
through a variety of informal channels, and rarely benefits from formal
appraisal by a court or tribunal. The International Court, with its usual
load of two or three cases per year, and public international arbitral
tribunals, with scarcely more than that, can hardly be deemed to repre-
sent international decision.
Despite the relative inactivity of these institutions, many international
scholars continue to view them as the virtual apotheosis and most au-
thoritative expression of international law. The deference given ad hoe
arbitral tribunals is symptomatic of this general problem and sometimes
takes the most extraordinary form. A tribunal established by one party,
in the absence of the other, and composed of a single person, let us say a
professor of international law, is treated by other scholars as an authori-
tative oracle of international law. At the same time, commentators who
defer to such an award will insist that a contrary General Assembly vote,
supported by virtually every member state, is not indicative of interna-
tional law but is only a "recommendation."' 15
15.. See, e.g., the Caltex Award, and the ipse dixit of the arbitrator overruling a widely
supported vote of the General Assembly. Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco
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There are, to be sure, certain methodological advantages in using the
international case as an epistemic unit. Part of the attraction lies in its
relative simplicity, economy, and availability. Once there is fundamental
agreement among scholars that the case is an epistemic unit, there need
be no detailed investigation of factual material outside of the case, for the
case carries its own authoritative factual statement. Alternative methods
of research could require extensive field work or culling through
thousands of pages of documents of uneven probative value, in order to
determine what the decision actually was. A case presents that decision
in a neat "bite-sized" and easily digestible package, creating in the pro-
cess an illusion of consensus about the underlying events that probably
does not exist.
"Stipulating" the facts permits students of this epistemic unit to get on
with discussions of the law, freed from complicating political issues. For
those who confuse clerical tidiness with scientific method, there is the
ecstacy of imagining that the case method is "scientific," an enthusiasm
apparently animating many of the consumers of Langdell's work. And of
course, there is the latent drive among all who have been given profes-
sional legal training to view things in terms of courts. Outside of the
United States, admiration for the stability and achievements of the
American political-legal system leads many scholars to seek to adopt the
American legal style, as if the method of observation can bring about
qualitative changes in the things observed.
Yielding to these attractions, contemporary international legal science
has adopted a decisional unit that is convenient for scholars but ill-tooled
for the subject matter. It is reminiscent of the familiar story of a man, out
walking one night on a street in Vienna, who happens on another well-
dressed and plainly sober citizen who is crawling about on all fours in the
light cast by a street lamp. Naturally, the first fellow stops to find out if
there is something wrong. When the man on the ground explains that he
has lost his watch, the passerby offers to help him find it and asks exactly
where it fell. "Back there," the man on the ground motions, pointing into
the darkness on the other side of the street. "Then why aren't you look-
ing there?" the first fellow asks in exasperation. "Because," the man on
the ground explains as if it were perfectly obvious, "it's dark over there
and I can't see. But here it's light."
The transposition of the case unit to the international arena has per-
mitted international lawyers to dwell in a comforting pool of light. Yet
Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the
Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1, 27-31 (1978).
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much of the resulting international legal description is patently out of
step with elite expectations. The discrepancy is so painfully obvious that,
outside the small circle of international lawyers, it brings discredit upon
the very notion of international law. 16 Small wonder that political advis-
ers rarely use their international lawyers.
Toward a New International Epistemic Unit
Our hypothetical political adviser in Beijing studying the responses of
effective elites around the world during the Falkland Islands War is an
intuitive Holmesian. Rather than examine what is written in books
about law, the adviser located the functional elites whose behavior deter-
mined the outcome and made inferences about international law
accordingly.
If law is to be found in significant part in the application of norms to
particular cases and controversies, it is plain that such applications in
international politics must be sought in a much wider range of arenas
than the highly formalized and structured judicial fora of domestic sys-
tems. If this is done effectively, both scholar and practitioner will have
more reliable barometers of prevailing conceptions of law and the reali-
ties of the application of norms. Increased realism may aid not only the
practitioner advising clients but those attempting to identify pathological
features of the international legal system in order to develop alternatives.
One such alternative would take account of the limited cogency in the
international arena of the case as an epistemic unit by developing an ad-
ditional unit which might be referred to generically as the "incident." I
define an "incident" as an overt conflict between two or more actors in
the international system. It must be perceived as such by other key ac-
tors and resolved in some non-judicial fashion. Finally, and of critical
importance, its resolution must provide some indications of what elites in
a variety of effective processes consider to be acceptable 'behavior.
Though the incident is "resolved" in a factual if not authoritative sense,
without the judicial imprimatur which routinely indicates law in domes-
tic settings, the incident may often be a more reliable indicator of inter-
national law than are codes or case law.
Note that the inquiry being proposed here is quite different from the
routine examination of "practice" in international law. That inquiry
seeks to establish the existence of a bilateral or general norm or custom,
16. Indeed, even from judges in a system in which international law is the "supreme law of
the land." See, e.g., separate opinion of Robb, J. in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 823-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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by examining, ostensibly, a broad pattern of practice of states. 17 There
are many intellectual difficulties with the inquiry into practice. Neither
the volume nor the degree of uniformity of practice required has ever
been stated with precision. Moreover, examinations of practice do not
control for the variable of power. They do not seek to identify who,
among a large cast of characters, is effective. The incident, in contrast, is
not based on a large volume or flow of supposedly "uniform" events, but
instead takes a single critical event as a prism through which the reac-
tions of elites to particular behavior may be examined and assessed as an
indication of their views of law.
The incident as an epistemic unit does not, of itself, provide a more
accurate and reliable indicator of what elites hold the law to be. There
must be some systematic and disciplined way of reporting, codifying, and
appraising incidents. Without such a systemization, there is little to rec-
ommend the incident over the intuitive inferences of political analysts
such as our Chinese adviser. Moreover, reliance on a single incident, or a
small number of them, can lead to the same skewing effect encountered
in making inferences about contemporary international law from a small
number of judicial decisions. Indeed, the skewing effect may be even
more distorting, for given the political context of the events being ex-
amined, only a small segment of the global elite may be involved in a
single incident. What is needed is a systematic method for studying and
recording incidents so that through their constant preparation, our un-
derstanding of elite expectations can be continually refined and cor-
rected. In short, a paradigm must be established and a genre created.
Choosing Incidents
Among the formidable challenges posed by this proposal is the devel-
opment of criteria by which incidents are to be selected. Pending the
development of a substantial catalogue of incidents, the necessarily sub-
jective choice from among the infinite number of international events
may tend to reflect the biases of those making the selection. This prob-
lem would not be a novel one for legal epistomology, though at first
glance, it might appear to be. At a superficial level, the body of case law,
both domestic and international, exhibits a certain random if not haphaz-
ard quality. In the domestic sphere, most cases are initiated by private
entities seeking to maximize their special interests, and, accordingly, the
judicial responses to these private claims may have little to do with cen-
17. On the role of practice in the formation of international law, see generally BROwNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11 (1973); JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF
MANKIND 1-19 (1958); 1 O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-22 (1965).
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tral elite concerns. In the international sphere, key actors rarely go to
court. If they do, they usually are careful to prescribe in advance the
norms to be applied and to circumscribe the potential consequences of
the judgment. This randomness would appear to minimize the bias of a
formal selection process, though, of course, it also renders case law less
reliable as an indicator of elite perspectives.
A closer look at the judicial function reveals a very different picture.
Formal decision makers are not passive receivers of the cases they hear
or the codes they shape. In the United States, the Supreme Court
reserves for itself, in all but a limited category of cases, the power to
determine which cases it will certify for appeal before it. In this respect, it
is an implicit but nonetheless decisive factor in establishing the contours
as well as the content of the normative code it processes. As the agency
with the ultimate competence to determine its own jurisdiction, the In-
ternational Court may play a comparable role in its sphere. Hence it is
far from unprecedented that those preparing incidents themselves
choose, from the sadly abundant harvest of conflict in daily international
political life, events that are especially fit for study as incidents.
In fact, the student of incidents may be in a position to make a more
neutral choice than that of the formal decisionmaker and to provide a
more accurate picture of the operation of international law. An institu-
tion like the International Court of Justice may have to avoid cases
which would pit it head-on against the power process in order to preserve
itself.'8 As a result, the case law it produces may be limited to certain
peripheral areas of community organization. In contrast, the student of
incidents may choose to study and report as incidents any congeries of
past events. The critical problem is to choose events that accurately re-
flect key elite expectations. How is this to be done?
In constitutional law, the archetypal "important case" is characterized
by an appreciation on the part of all those who are involved in the case
that it is "decisive," i.e. that its disposition is likely to reshape the consti-
tutive process or key aspects of public order. Some incidents may be
characterized by participants in the same manner; they sense that the
issues at stake and the way they are decided will have a decisive effect on
expectations of authority with ramifying effects on political processes.
But this sense of moment on the part of participants in a situation is not a
necessary characteristic of those events that are chosen to be treated as
incidents. Their perceptions may be underinclusive, overinclusive, or
18. See generally REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT




both. Thus, they may accord little authoritative weight to events which
reinforce or make only minor changes in norms, but which are nonethe-
less of importance in explaining how international decisions are made.
On the other hand, they may exaggerate the importance of particular
events as a way of mobilizing themselves, their polities, or their allies in a
program that serves their own interests. It is, in the final analysis, the
perspective of the student of incidents, rather than the participants in the
events themselves, that must be determinative. Important cases are not
all constitutional cases; and incidents do not comprise only "constitu-
tive" events.
Identifying the Relevant Facts
Napoleon's remark that history is a collection of lies we all agree upon
has an especially wicked relevance when we consider as a source of his-
tory the recital of the facts contained in judicial opinions. The statement
of "relevant" facts determined by a court would rarely satisfy a historian;
indeed, what the court leaves out is often of most interest to the student
of politics and history. Consider a few examples.
The Schooner Exchange19 judgment of Chief Justice Marshall is usu-
ally cited as the cornerstone for the doctrine that the public acts of for-
eign governments will not be reviewed by the courts of another state even
if the effects of the act are felt in that other state. Somehow the judgment
never states the extraordinary fact that the case was being decided
against the background of the War of 1812, in which the British had set
fire to Washington. France, the real defendant, was the only ally of the
United States. It seems most unlikely under these circumstances that any
United States court would have risked imperilling that relationship. In
the Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom v. Albania)20 the Interna-
tional Court somehow never mentions the fact that the Greek Civil War
was under way, that the United Kingdom was a major supporter of the
Royalist cause, and that Albaniaas a proxy for another superpower, was
supporting the Communist insurgency. The presence of the British ships
in the Straits of Corfu unquestionably constituted a manifest military
communication to the Albanians and others about the limits of British
tolerance, the susceptability of Albania to coastal attacks, and the capac-
ity of the British fleet to project its force into that arena.
The point need not be belabored. What these cases demonstrate is that
there is no authoritative institution to decree or stipulate that the facts
19. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
20. 1949 I.C.J. 4.
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which have been assembled in judgments meet the standards of historical
accuracy.
Indeed, legal science is often impatient to finish with "the facts" and to
get on with "the law." First instance factual determinations are only
rarely reviewed. Subsequent instances simplify the facts even further. In
American legal education, the tendency of first-year students to seek to
learn more about the facts of the case is often characterized as a frivolous
interest; students are urged to get on with the legal analysis.
There are some cogent reasons for this cultivated astigmatism. Every
science develops its own specialized lens in order to focus more sharply
and intensively on that aspect of life of interest to it. The particular focus
of legal science distinguishes it from history and sociology and does, in-
deed, permit it to concentrate more effectively on the normative or policy
dimensions of problems. But sometimes, sticky political problems or is-
sues can be concealed under a bare factual statement and the infinitely
obscurantist potentialities of legal language. These selective abbrevia-
tions, whatever their intra-disciplinary justification, inevitably produce a
legal version of the facts which historians and political advisers often see
as, at best, thin and brittle, and, at worst, caricatures of what actually
transpired. Since a fuller and more accurate understanding of the facts is
indispensable to ascertaining what was actually decided, the versions of
the facts often presented by judges may undermine the effectiveness of
the predictive function of case law.
The sporadic fashion in which the facts become available in incidents
presents a special problem. Many facts are concealed for years or even
generations. The attack on Pearl Harbor, for example, could not be de-
scribed with any accuracy until the archives in all the relevant capitals
were at last made accessible to historians. It took a generation for schol-
ars to provide a comprehensive picture that could demonstrate the incor-
rectness of many of their initial conclusions about the incident. 21
Similarly, the extent of U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the Mos-
sadegh government in Iran and the reinstallation of the Pahlavi dynasty
in 1953 was not established until years later.22
If incidents studies had been prepared for each of these events, they
would, in all likelihood, have been factually inaccurate or incomplete.
Similarly, if a complete statement of the facts were a prerequisite for
21. See, eg., G. PRANGE, AT DAWN WE SLEPT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF PEARL HAR-
BOR (1981).
22. See 1 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT ON FOREIGN AND MILITARY IN-
TELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1976).
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studying incidents, several of the studies in this volume would be barred.
That would be most unfortunate, for whether or not lawyers study inci-
dents, political actors unquestionably do. They use the best information
available in making inferences about normative expectations, among
other things.
This is not a problem unique to incidents. In some cases, national
courts refuse to exercise jurisdiction because information indispensable to
judgment cannot be secured. In international law, judgments of the ICJ
may be reopened and revised on the basis of new facts or new informa-
tion.2 3 If anything, the problem is considerably less severe in the study of
incidents. The student of incidents, it will be recalled, is not involved in
judging the lawfulness of the behavior of actors in the incident con-
cerned, but rather evaluates the reactions of other relevant actors and,
through those reactions, the subjective conceptions of right and/or toler-
able behavior entertained by those other actors. Hence what is important
in this exercise is not so much what happened as what effective elites
think happened and how they react.
A related practical difficulty in constructing the genre of incidents is
the question of boundaries: where does a particular incident begin and
where does it end? A case presupposes a consensus that critical events
begin and end at some point. An incident is not bounded with such pre-
cision. Because of this, there is some question as to when it ends, if at all.
Territorial losses, for example, may be viewed by the party securing ac-
quisition as completed incidents, with title consolidated by adverse pos-
session. But the losing party may continue to view the lost territories as
its own and dream and plan for their repatriation. Hence the two parties
to an incident may have diametrically opposite conceptions of when the
incident ended. It is the observer of the incident who must, in effect,
establish boundaries in time. Those boundaries are determined primarily
by the norms the observer chooses to examine.
Bias in the Choice and Construction of Incidents
Most of the incidents in this volume were prepared by young North
American students in a seminar conducted by North American scholars.
Every effort was made to be scrupulous in the description of the events
23. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 61, § 2. The government of Tunisia
recently invoked this provision in seeking a revision of the ICJ's 1982 judgment regarding the
delimitation of the continental shelf between Tunisia and Libya. See ICJ Application Institut-
ing Proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 27 July 1984. Application for Revision
and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the case concerning the Continen-
tal Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).
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and the facts. Yet, without question, factors such as nationality, culture,
class, race or ethnicity, interest group, and exposure to crisis influenced
the choice of events, their description, and their appraisal. Students of
incidents are certainly prone to this pathology, but theirs is not a unique
susceptibility. Court personnel are as subject to bias as anyone else, yet,
as we have seen, their factual recitations receive remarkably uncritical
acceptance by virtue of their presumed neutrality. Precisely because this
is a presumption which students of incidents are never likely to enjoy, it
is arguably the case that factual bias will prove less of a problem for the
incident study than it is for the judicial opinion. The quality of the fac-
tual description will be assessed on its merits and, thus, must meet a
standard ordinarily not applied to factual statements in judgments.
Moreover, the relation of facts to conclusions is qualitatively different in
an incident than in a judgment. The incident, after all, is not a judgment
of the lawfulness of the behavior of a given actor. It is, rather, an attempt
to identify, by an examination of the reaction of all other actors, what
norms were actually engaged in a particular incident.
Normative Implications of the Approach
The modern notion of law envisions a rational process of organized
public deliberation. This is seen as increasing the likelihood of agreement
on community goals, with a thorough canvassing of the comparative so-
cial costs of alternative methods of securing them. Additionally, such a
process ensures equality of treatment and facilitates participation by all
interested parties.
Some who endorse this concept of law are apt to find disturbing the
fact that the incidents approach draws its normative inferences from no
more than the apparent expectations of elites. The approach thus seems
to devalue the rational and deliberative elements of law-making. It is not
the intention of the incidents approach to do so. It strives merely to
acknowledge the painfil fact that these elements are all too frequently
jettisoned by effective elites in their decision-making calculus. It is true
that in recognizing the potential desuetude of the formal legal order, the
approach may, in the short term, exacerbate the problem. However, in-
sofar as it aids in diagnosis, it may be hoped that the incidents approach
will be a positive first step in restoring rational, deliberative lawmaking in
the international community.
Using the Results of Incident Studies
In formal systems based on stare decisis, previous judgments of courts
are invoked in current disputes in an effort to persuade the court that the
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facts in the older case are sufficiently similar to those at bar to warrant
applying the same legal specification to them. Citation of previous deci-
sions performs a systemic function as well, for it validates the authority
and significance of the very institution which has been called upon to
render judgment.
It is doubtful that incidents can aspire to a comparable utility in for-
mal decision situations. In the first place, international adjudication and
arbitration are creatures of contract. The international tribunal trying a
case is frequently bound to apply law, as defined in its constitutive instru-
ment. Thus, the International Court of Justice is admonished in its Stat-
ute to apply to the cases before it a wholly anachronistic conception of
international law that excludes some of its most dynamic elements. In
this context, it would be unavailing and possibly perilous to invite a tri-
bunal to conceive of the law it is to apply in terms of incidents.
In a more profound sense, international tribunals may be expected to
resist the very idea of the incident as an epistemic unit of law. After all,
its raison d'etre as a genre, as well as each individual incident study, pre-
supposes the frequent ineffectiveness of formal decision institutions. In
this respect, the incident cannot and, indeed, should not be expected to
supplant case law. Rather, incidents may serve as a type of "meta-law,"
providing normative guidelines for decisionmakers in the international
system in those vast deserts in which case law is sparse. The incident
study can also aid in evaluating the output of the formal institutions of
international law in those rare oases where its growth is luxuriant.
Conclusion
This volume contains a set of studies of contemporary incidents. To-
gether, they may be taken as a first, experimental effort at establishing a
format for a new genre in international legal analysis. It is hoped that the
economy of the format and the reliability of the normative descriptions it
provides will gain international acceptance for the incidents approach.
A single collection of incidents will be of relatively little value. A genre
whose practitioners continue to update and correct the expression of the
code of international law is required. If it is established and adopted (and
adapted) by a number of other scholars, it can ultimately yield an abun-
dant literature of international appraisal, richer than the limited number
of cases decided by courts, more representative of actual decision trends,
more indicative of the political context in which decisions are taken and
implemented and, most importantly, more accurate in expressing inter-
national normative expectations.
It is to be hoped that this effort will generate interest in the incident as
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an indicator of law and a form of knowledge, and that volumes will fol-
low on a regular basis, setting out current incidents. Innovative student
international law journals in the United States might establish a section
of each issue dedicated to incidents, alongside the more conventional case
note. By providing a more accurate and comprehensive picture of how
international law is made and applied, efforts such as these may aid in the
performance of legal tasks and in identifying and bringing about needed
constitutive changes in the international legal system.
